Xee Services — Privacy Policy

Policy last revised: 8 October 2026.

Effective date: 8 October 2026.

Operator / data controller: Zaid Tiwana.

Privacy and support contact: info@laxee.xyz.

Support telephone: +1 406 608 3341.

Website: https://xee-services.pages.dev. The intended custom website address is https://www.laxee.xyz after domain activation.

This policy covers the Xee Services administrator extension, client extension, and supporting API, WebSocket service and administrative panel operated by the publisher identified above. The stable 1.2.0 extension display name is Xee Services (Laxee). It does not cover a separate proxy-distribution product or an experimental testing build.

Intended users and distribution

Xee Services is intended for the operator's private/internal use and authorized remote employees or team members. It is not offered as an open public commercial session-sharing, consumer proxy or VPN service. The public website provides product information, privacy disclosures and support contacts; it does not offer public registration or automatically grant access to managed accounts.

The operator intends to restrict administrator-extension distribution using a private or unlisted listing. The client extension may have a public Chrome Web Store listing for employee installation, but installation by itself does not enroll a person or authorize access to another account: the intended workflow requires administrator-approved enrollment and assignment. Listing visibility is a distribution setting, not a substitute for authentication. This policy describes the intended distribution model, not a claim that the Store's visibility settings have been independently verified or changed.

The data disclosures in this policy apply to the administrator and enrolled employees even though this is an internal tool. Organizations remain responsible for proper authority, employee notices, an appropriate legal basis and any consent required for session sharing and network routing. Describing the use as private or internal does not waive those responsibilities or a website provider's terms.

1. What the service does

Xee Services provides authorized, centrally managed access to website sessions for enrolled users. An administrator selects a website session, shares it with an intended enrolled recipient, and manages its duration and access state. Related functionality includes saved-service restoration and updates, connection status, notifications and an optional inbuilt, administrator-managed browser proxy setup. Proxy support is a disclosed companion to managed access, not a separate operating-system VPN or unrestricted anonymity service.

Session cookies and website storage can give access to an account without entering its password again. Share only accounts and data you are authorized to share, only with authorized recipients, and in accordance with the website provider's terms and applicable law. Xee Services does not grant permission to use another person's account or override a website's access restrictions. A recipient may see the account content available through an assigned session.

2. Information the extensions and service handle

Account, enrollment and authentication information

We process administrator/client usernames or labels, internal account/installation identifiers, enrollment keys, application authentication credentials and tokens, cryptographic public keys, and connection/authentication status. Cryptographic private keys and relevant application credentials are stored in the extension's local browser storage for its operation. Optional service-login and proxy credentials entered by an administrator are also processed for their corresponding features.

Website session information

When an administrator captures or updates a service session, the extension reads cookies for the relevant website/domain and, where accessible, the selected page's localStorage and sessionStorage. Cookie data includes names, values and associated attributes. Website storage can contain authentication tokens and other personal or sensitive information placed there by that website. Capture is not limited to a single known token field: the present implementation can copy the accessible storage entries of the relevant origin.

The client receives assigned session material, stores it locally and writes it into the relevant website's cookie and page-storage areas to restore the assigned session. Restoration may clear or replace that website's existing page storage. Expiry/revocation cleanup may also remove cookies and localStorage for the affected origin, including other data already stored for that origin.

Service and operational information

We process managed website domains/URLs, service names and supplied logo references, sender/recipient identifiers, service assignments, access duration/expiry, paused/revoked/deleted states, presence/heartbeat information, delivery acknowledgements, pending shares and control commands, and activity timestamps/logs. The administrator can see enrolled clients and operational/access information in the management panel.

Browser and network information

The extensions inspect relevant tab URLs and navigation events to select or restore managed sessions and enforce their access states. They observe request URLs/hosts, response/error information and proxy-authentication challenges for proxy routing, authentication and connection-health features. Much of this processing takes place locally in the browser; it is still covered by this policy. The service does not use this information to compile an advertising browsing-history profile.

The backend and its hosting/network providers receive connection information needed to handle requests, such as an IP address, request metadata and security/diagnostic information. Their precise logging and backup-retention configuration has not been independently verified; this policy does not promise a fixed infrastructure retention period.

Inbuilt proxy setup and authentication support

An administrator can save proxy profiles and select a default or a client-specific assignment. We process the profile name/identifier, proxy host or IP address, port, protocol, username/password where supplied, enabled/allowed state, assignments, domain-routing lists and connection/error status. The management backend stores this configuration and sends the relevant settings and credentials to the administrator extension and eligible enrolled clients over the service connection. Clients follow authenticated administrator/server settings; the stable client has no manual proxy-credential or external-auth editor. Online changes synchronize over the connection, and offline clients obtain current settings after a working authenticated reconnect.

The inbuilt proxy changes Chrome's browser proxy configuration. Depending on the selected mode and filters, it can route selected domains or broader HTTP/HTTPS browser traffic, not merely the one shared session. An allowlist routes matching domains through the proxy and other domains directly; a bypass/denylist routes matching domains directly and other domains through the proxy. These lists are routing choices, not a claim that every listed website is blocked. The product's backend and local addresses have direct exceptions in its own routing configuration. Higher-priority browser policies, other extensions or system VPNs can affect the actual route. A browser DIRECT exception does not guarantee bypass of a system VPN.

A separate, optional external-proxy authentication helper can supply the configured credentials for this extension's own matching backend requests when another browser extension selects an authenticated proxy route. It is administrator-controlled, defaults off, and synchronizes independently of the inbuilt website-proxy on/off switches. The administrator can use the saved default/assigned proxy or set a server-side manual override. Saving or synchronizing these authentication credentials does not by itself turn on a proxy, change the chosen route or reconfigure a third-party extension. The helper checks the proxy challenge, configured endpoint and extension/backend request scope; it does not request an unrelated website's login password.

Request completion/errors and matching proxy-authentication challenges are observed to operate authentication and display connection status. The administrator's proxy Test function sends the host/port to the backend, which attempts a TCP connection and returns reachability, timing and error information. A reachable port is not proof that proxy authentication, destination access or every request will succeed. The configured proxy endpoint receives that test connection and associated network metadata. Xee Services does not use these observations to sell or compile an advertising browsing profile.

While the inbuilt proxy is active, the extension attempts to restrict non-proxied WebRTC UDP and disable Chrome network prediction. When cleared, its implementation sets those options to Chrome default/enabled values rather than guaranteeing restoration of every previously customized setting. These measures do not guarantee zero IP/DNS leaks or uninterrupted access on every network. Chrome enterprise policy can limit extension control.

Analytics and this website

The reviewed 1.2.0 bundles contain a legacy Google Analytics module. Its sending code is restricted to an older extension runtime ID, which does not match either current administrator or client extension ID supplied by the operator. That module therefore does not send analytics events when these bundles run under the current IDs. This is a code-and-ID verification, not a live network capture; any future change to the module or extension IDs must be reviewed and disclosed before release.

This static product website contains no analytics scripts, account login or support-submission form. Its hosting provider processes the connection information needed to serve pages, such as an IP address and request metadata. Emailing or calling support sends the information you choose to provide through the corresponding communication provider; do not send session tokens, private keys or passwords.

3. Why information is used

Information is used to enroll/authenticate users; capture and deliver administrator-authorized sessions; restore or update assigned services; enforce access duration and administrator controls; synchronize configuration and connection state; operate optional proxy access; notify users; and diagnose, secure and maintain the disclosed service. It is not used for unrelated advertising, sale of personal data, credit decisions or data-broker profiles.

4. Who receives information

• Authorized recipients and administrators: the intended recipient receives the session material needed to access an assigned account; authorized administrators manage service/session and client operational information.
• Our service infrastructure: the API/WebSocket backend processes session-management information and saved-service data. Railway is the hosting provider used for the current service. This policy does not make a verified country-specific data-residency commitment. Hosting and network providers may process data in the locations used by their services.
• Selected proxy providers: the provider of the administrator-configured proxy processes connections actually routed through its endpoint and receives the proxy authentication details needed for that connection. Depending on the protocol and encryption, it can observe the source/egress IPs, requested destination hosts, connection timing and traffic volume, and unencrypted traffic content. HTTPS does not encrypt every aspect of proxy negotiation, and an HTTP proxy-authentication hop is not automatically protected by TLS. HTTPS website content normally remains protected by its TLS connection unless that protection is changed or intercepted. Providers may keep their own logs under their policies; this policy does not promise that a selected provider is log-free. The optional third-party-proxy auth helper does not select that third party's route or alter its separate data practices.
• Website providers: the websites used with assigned sessions receive normal browser requests, restored authentication/session values and connection information under their own policies. External logo resources, if fetched, are also served by their respective hosts.
• Website hosting and support communications: the intended website host is Cloudflare Pages. Support email is operated using Google Workspace and the listed telephone contact uses Google Voice. These providers process website requests and communications needed for their services. Google Chrome/Chrome Web Store operation is separately governed by Google's policies. The legacy analytics module is inactive for the current extension IDs described above.
• Legally necessary disclosures: information may be disclosed when legally required or necessary to investigate security incidents, fraud or abuse, subject to applicable law and Chrome Web Store Limited Use restrictions. Transfers related to a business sale require the consent/notice required by those restrictions and applicable law.

We do not sell user data or transfer it for personalized advertising. Human access to user data is restricted to explicit user-authorized assistance, necessary security investigation, legal obligations, or aggregated/anonymized internal operations permitted under the Limited Use requirements.

5. Storage, transmission and security

Production extension-to-backend connections use HTTPS and WSS. Direct extension-to-recipient sharing encrypts the session payload using the recipient's cryptographic public key. Queued direct-share payloads retain that encryption.

There is also a saved-service path: captured service material is sent to the backend, encrypted at rest using AES-256-GCM, and decrypted by the backend when needed for authorized restoration or service-update synchronization. Consequently, not every path is end-to-end encrypted against the backend operator. Encryption at rest is not the same as making data inaccessible to the authorized operator.

Local extension storage contains session material, cryptographic keys and relevant credentials; it is not separately encrypted at rest by this application. Its protection depends on the device, Chrome profile and operating-system controls. Use managed, trusted devices and restrict access to their browser profiles. No network, browser-storage or security mechanism provides an absolute guarantee against compromise.

Saved proxy passwords and server-side external-auth override passwords are encrypted at rest by the backend using AES-256-GCM and decrypted when required for authorized settings delivery. Other proxy metadata, such as host, username and routing lists, is not covered by that password-encryption claim. Operational credentials are available in extension-local storage/in-memory state for authentication; they are not separately application-encrypted there. Neither administrator-to-client configuration delivery nor encryption at rest makes the proxy password inaccessible to the authorized backend operator or the configured proxy endpoint.

6. Retention and deletion

• Local assigned-session records remain while pending or active and are removed by the applicable expiry, revoke, delete or cleanup actions. Some pause states retain the session to permit resumption. An unlimited-duration assignment does not have an automatic time expiry.
• Undelivered direct shares are queued until acknowledgement, replacement, expiry or the corresponding access/account cleanup. Offline devices apply relevant updates when they can reconnect; cleanup is not guaranteed to execute instantly on an unreachable device.
• Saved-service sessions/optional credentials and proxy configuration remain until replaced or deleted through the management controls. Expiring a recipient's assignment does not automatically delete the administrator's saved source service.
• Turning the inbuilt proxy off clears its active configuration/credential cache as implemented; it is not equivalent to deleting the administrator's server-side proxy library. Turning the separate external-auth helper off clears its active authentication secrets after the relevant authenticated synchronization. Updating, clearing an override, changing defaults and deleting a saved profile are distinct operations. A remote change cannot arrive instantly at an unreachable client; offline devices need a working reconnect.
• Account/history/control records have different lifecycle rules. Some history actions hide an entry rather than erase the live account. Use the appropriate permanent deletion action or contact the operator for a deletion request.
• Application activity logs in the reviewed backend are bounded to the most recent 5,000 entries; there is no universal automatic day-based retention limit in that implementation.
• The operator has not confirmed a fixed retention period for infrastructure logs, hosting backups or support communications, or whether separate Railway backups are enabled. No automatic 30/90-day deletion promise is made. Provider retention depends on the actual provider and deployment configuration. Contact the operator for a specific retention or deletion request; deletion from active application records must not be assumed to remove every provider-held backup immediately.

Removing a browser profile/extension is not a request to erase all backend records. Removing local cookies is not guaranteed to revoke every token or device session at the original website; use that website's own security/session controls when necessary.

7. Choices and privacy requests

Administrators control session capture/sharing, assignments, access state, duration, proxy profiles/assignments, routing lists and the separate external-auth helper. The administrator's own proxy connection is separate from client proxy grants. Enrolled users should receive a clear explanation of the managed service, relevant browser-network changes and its data handling before use; lack of a client-side settings editor does not replace this notice. Managed installations may be subject to their organization's policies.

To request access, correction or deletion of information held by the operator, or ask a privacy question, contact info@laxee.xyz. We may request proportionate verification before acting on a request. The rights and exceptions available depend on applicable law. Organizations deploying the product are responsible for appropriate notices, authority and consent for their users and shared accounts.

8. Chrome Web Store Limited Use

Our use of data obtained through Chrome/browser APIs is limited to the service's disclosed, user-facing purpose and related necessary operation/security. We follow the Chrome Web Store User Data Policy and its Limited Use requirements, including the restrictions on transfers, human access, personalized advertising and sale of user data.

Where information is received from Google APIs, its use and transfer will comply with the Chrome Web Store User Data Policy, including the Limited Use requirements. This statement does not imply that this product uses Google OAuth or requests Google-account API scopes when it does not.

9. Other websites and policy changes

Website owners and selected proxy/network providers have their own policies and terms. This policy describes Xee Services' handling, not their independent processing. The operator should identify the currently selected proxy provider to affected users; changing the configured provider can change the party receiving routed network traffic. No provider-specific logging or anonymity guarantee is made by Xee Services.

We will update this policy when the disclosed practices change. Material changes requiring additional disclosure/consent will be explained before the changed processing begins. The current public policy is available at https://xee-services.pages.dev/privacy.html and will also be available at https://www.laxee.xyz/privacy.html once the custom domain is activated.

10. Contact

Zaid Tiwana

Privacy and support email: info@laxee.xyz

Support telephone: +1 406 608 3341

Website: https://xee-services.pages.dev